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IRENAS, District Judge. 
 Appellants were convicted of various counts of fraud 
stemming from their attempts to disclaim performance and payment 
bonds issued in connection with a construction project.  Pursuant 
to U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b), the trial court determined the amount of 
loss for sentencing purposes to be in excess of $1,500,000, most 
of which represented the mortgagee's cost to complete the project 
 
 
after taking it over from the mortgagor/developer. Although the 
mortgagee was not an obligee under the bonds, the district court 
nonetheless concluded that its loss was properly attributable to 
the appellants' fraudulent conduct.   
 Appellants raise a number of challenges to their convictions 
and sentences and to the district court's denial of motions for a 
new trial.  We will affirm the judgments of conviction and the 
district court's denial of appellants' motions for a new trial.  
However, because we find that the trial court improperly 
calculated the losses resulting from the appellants' fraudulent 




 I.      
 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 Appellant Sidney Cohen ("Cohen") was a principal in Green 
Hill Associates ("Green Hill"), a limited partnership and the 
developer of the Green Hill Apartment Building Project ("the 
project") in Susquehanna Township, Pennsylvania.  The project was 
financed by an $8.9 million mortgage loan to Green Hill from the 
Summit Tax Exempt Bond Fund, L.P. ("Summit"), which in turn was 
headed by Stuart J. Boesky ("Boesky"). 
 Construction on the project began in July of 1986.  By the 
spring of 1987, the project was substantially behind schedule.  
Cohen sought to replace the general contractor, Susquehanna 
Construction Company ("Susquehanna"), with Eastern Consolidated 
 
 
Utilities, Inc. ("ECU"), a building contractor owned and operated 
by appellant John L. ("Jack") Daddona ("Daddona").  Summit agreed 
to the substitution, provided ECU obtain performance and payment 
bonds in the amount of $3 million.1 Summit also threatened 
foreclosure unless the bonds were produced by July 29, 1987. 
 Daddona consulted Daniel Culnen ("Culnen") of the Culnen & 
Hamilton Agency ("C & H"), one of the largest independent surety 
bond brokers on the East Coast and Daddona's long-time insurance 
agent.  He advised Culnen of Summit's demand, and Culnen agreed 
to issue the bonds through Employers Insurance of Wausau 
("Wausau"), for whom he was a registered independent agent.  
However, as a condition to his agreement, Culnen required that 
Daddona, Cohen, and their families agree in writing to personally 
indemnify Wausau for any claims paid on the bonds.2 
 By letter dated June 15, 1987, Culnen advised Summit that in 
the event ECU were to become the project's general contractor, it 
                     
     1  A performance bond guarantees the owner that the general 
contractor will perform his contract.  A payment bond, sometimes 
referred to as a labor and materials bond, guarantees the that 
the general contractor's subcontractors and materialmen will be 
paid for their services.  The bonds are usually issued in tandem. 
It should be noted that while Green Hill, as owner, had rights 
under both bonds, and the subcontractors and materialmen had 
rights under the payment bond, Summit was not an obligee under 
either bond. See p. 24, infra. 
     2  The requirement that Cohen execute an indemnity agreement 
was unusual in that it essentially vitiated any benefits that 
might have inured to Cohen from the bonds.  At trial, Culnen 
explained his concern that Cohen, who had earlier filed what 
Culnen considered to be specious claims against the bonds held by 
Susquehanna, would make similar claims against ECU's bonds.  The 
indemnity agreement was expressly designed to prevent Green Hill 
from filing claims under the bonds. 
 
 
would be able to obtain the necessary bonding.  Thereafter, on 
July 6, 1987, Cohen, Daddona, and their families executed an 
indemnity agreement.  On July 20, 1987, ECU and Green Hill 
entered into a $3.4 million contract for the completion of the 
project. 
 On July 27, 1987, Culnen directed his bond manager, Pamela 
Hayes ("Hayes"), to prepare the bonds on Wausau forms.  Hayes 
prepared the bonds, affixed the Wausau corporate seal, and 
attached power of attorney forms.  Hayes, purportedly at Culnen's 
behest, did not follow the usual procedure and give the bonds a 
new number. Rather, she affixed a number that had been used on a 
previous ECU project and then twice witnessed Culnen's signature 
under the fictitious name of "B. Adams." 
 Culnen signed both bonds and delivered them to Daddona along 
with a cover letter explaining the method of calculating the bond 
premium.  Although Culnen did have authority to execute and 
deliver Wausau bonds, he breached his own agreement with Wausau 
by failing to report his execution and delivery of the bonds and 
by failing to obtain Wausau's prior approval. 
 Daddona signed the bonds on July 29, 1987, and forwarded 
them to Cohen.  Cohen witnessed Daddona's signatures on the bonds 
and directed his attorney, Mitchell Leiderman ("Leiderman"), to 
forward copies of the bonds to Summit, which Leiderman did on 
July 30, 1994.  Summit halted its foreclosure proceedings, and 
ECU commenced work on the project in August of 1987. 
 
 A. Padding the Invoice 
 
 
 In August Culnen prepared and mailed to Daddona an invoice 
for the bond premiums in the amount of $42,413.  Shortly 
thereafter Cohen called Culnen and instructed him to prepare a 
new invoice in the amount of $52,413, the difference representing 
an unrelated $10,000 consulting fee owed by Cohen to Culnen.  
Daddona indicated that he had no objections to the request. 
 At Daddona's direction, Culnen forwarded the upwardly 
revised invoice to Cohen, who submitted it to Summit on October 
7, 1987, as part of a monthly requisition.  When Summit released 
the funds to Cohen on October 21, 1987, Cohen immediately 
forwarded the monies to Culnen and received a check back from 
Culnen for $10,000 on November 27, 1987. 
 Culnen retained the remaining $42,413 for a period of time, 
but was pressured by Cohen and Daddona to divide the money.  
Consequently, Culnen agreed to give Daddona a $32,413 credit 
against his outstanding account balance, which was memorialized 
in a credit memo dated May 11, 1988.  On May 16, 1988, Culnen 
forwarded a second check for $10,000 to Cohen. 
 
 B. Resuming Construction 
 Once the new general contractor was in place, Cohen sought 
to entice the subcontractors, many of whom had left the project 
for non-payment, to return to work on the project.  At several 
jobsite meetings conducted in August of 1987, Cohen and ECU 
employees displayed copies of the bonds and assured the 
subcontractors that the bonds guaranteed their payment.  At least 
two subcontractors, Thomas Strawbridge and Robert Yingling, 
 
 
subsequently executed contracts with ECU for work on the project.  
Copies of the bond were also mailed to Les Stewart ("Stewart") of 
York Excavating Company ("York"), thereby inducing him to return 
to work. 
 
 C. Disclaiming the Bonds 
 By the end of 1987, the project was still behind schedule, 
and Summit was again threatening foreclosure.  In or around 
December of 1987, Cohen and Daddona returned the original bonds 
to Culnen without informing Summit or the subcontractors.3  By 
January of 1988, most of the subcontractors had left the site for 
non-payment, and on February 5, 1988, Summit commenced 
foreclosure proceedings.   
 In a settlement reached on April 8, 1988, Summit agreed to 
pay Green Hill $216,000 less the amount of any unpaid 
subcontractor bills then due and owing on the project.  In 
return, Green Hill agreed to deed the project to Boesky's 
nominee, Green Hill Investors,4 to assign to Summit Green Hill's 
rights (but not its obligations) in the contract with ECU, and to 
                     
     3  While it may be that Cohen or Daddona thought that by 
returning the original bonds to the issuer they were limiting the 
rights of potential claimants, and thereby their indemnity 
obligations to Wausau, there is no legal basis for concluding 
that the rights of parties who entered into contracts or 
performed labor in reliance on the bonds could have their rights 
unilaterally terminated in this manner. Indeed, the indictment 
itself was premised, at least in part, on the validity of the 
bonds. If the bonds were in fact not valid when issued, there 
could be no fraud in disavowing them. 
     4  For convenience, we will refer to Summit and Green Hill 
Investors collectively as "Summit."  
 
 
escrow Cohen's beneficial interest in the bonds to pay off liens 
that might accrue on the property in the four months following 
the settlement.5 
 In March, Wausau began to receive claims on the payment 
bond.  On March 16, 1988, the attorney for the International 
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Union ("IBEW") filed a claim 
against the bond with Wausau's home office in Wisconsin and 
forwarded copies to Cohen and Daddona.  On March 21, 1988, Jack 
Meyers ("Meyers") of Construction Management Corporation ("CMC") 
also made a claim by sending a copy of the claim letter to 
Wausau's regional bond manager in Totowa, New Jersey, Ken Gelok 
("Gelok"). CMC and York filed formal claims against Wausau on 
April 14, 1988. 
 Gelok was surprised by the claims.  Company policy required 
both regional manager and home office approval prior to the 
issuance of any bonds in excess of $750,000.  Gelok knew nothing 
of the bonds and called Culnen on or about March 25, 1987, to 
clarify the situation.  Culnen advised Gelok that the claims were 
not valid because he had the cancelled bonds in his possession. 
 At a meeting in Culnen's office on March 29, 1988,  Culnen 
                     
     5  The four-month escrow period tracked the Pennsylvania 
statute of limitations for the filing of mechanic's liens. 49 
P.S. § 1502. It is clear that Green Hill's assignment was 
strictly limited to the possible liability to existing unpaid 
subcontractors who were either known at the closing or who filed 
claims within four months. The essence of the settlement was that 
Summit's nominees would take the project free and clear of any 
existing claims of ECU's subcontractors. In fact, those debts 
were paid by deductions from the $216,000 owed to Green Hill, and 




delivered the bonds to Gelok and falsely assured him that the 
bonds were not valid, that he had never signed them, and that 
someone else -- perhaps Meyers -- had forged his signature. 
Culnen repeated this tale in a letter dated April 15, 1988, in 
which he advised Gelok that the bonds were forgeries and that 
York's and CMC's claims were "phoney claims filed by crooks who 
probably stole blank forms and forged [Culnen's] signature."   
 On April 20, 1988, Gelok again met with Culnen at the 
latter's office.  During the course of the meeting, Gelok advised 
Culnen that he had been unable to contact Cohen to confirm 
Culnen's story about the bonds.  Culnen then picked up the 
telephone, dialed some numbers, and handed the phone to Gelok.  A 
man who identified himself as Sidney Cohen informed Gelok that 
"there was no bond in force, there never was and there never 
would be."  Daddona App. at 325.  The man also advised Gelok that 
the bonds on which Meyers' and Stewart's claims were based were 
forgeries, and that Meyers may have been the one who forged 
Culnen's signature. 
 On April 22, 1988, Culnen wrote a second letter to Gelok, in 
which he informed Gelok that he had contacted Daddona, then on a 
hunting trip in Alaska, and "the conclusion we [i.e., Culnen and 
Daddona] came to is . . . that Meyers signed the bond form, which 
was blank, in Jack's office pending finalization of negotiations 
with the owner."  Daddona App. at 223-24.  Relying on the letters 
from Culnen and Gelok's conversation with Cohen, Wausau advised 
Meyers by letter dated April 20, 1988, that no Wausau bonds 
existed on the Green Hill project.  Thereafter, on April 26, 
 
 
1988, Wausau issued a second letter, denying Stewart's and 
Meyers' bond claims on the grounds that no valid bonds existed 
for the project.  On May 6, 1988, Wausau denied the IBEW claim.  
 On June 16, 1988, Summit, while in the midst of hiring a new 
general contractor, sent a letter to Wausau inquiring about the 
status of the bonds.  Culnen advised Wausau by letter dated June 
21, 1988, that he had neither executed nor delivered the bonds.  
Wausau subsequently advised Summit on June 27, 1988, that no 
bonds existed on the project.  On September 30, 1988, Summit 
filed a formal claim against the bonds, in which it alleged that 
ECU's failure to perform had cost it $3 million in damages.  The 
claim was denied by Wausau in a letter dated October 7, 1988.  
The letter recited that no valid bonds existed on the project, 
and that even if there were valid bonds, Summit was not a proper 
claimant.  
 
 D. The Unravelling of the Scheme  
 In July of 1988, Meyers contacted the United States Postal 
Inspectors, prompting an investigation into the project.  On 
August 5, 1988, grand jury subpoenas were served on Pamela Hayes 
and C & H.  On October 13, 1988, Culnen admitted to Wausau that 
he had indeed executed and delivered the bonds in July of 1987 
and that they were not forgeries.  Culnen and C & H were indicted 
in June of 1991.  In November of 1991, Culnen entered into a plea 
agreement by which he agreed to plead guilty to two counts of 
mail fraud and cooperate with the government in its investigation 
of Cohen and Daddona. 
 
 
 Appellants were indicted in July of 1992 and charged with 
conspiracy to commit mail fraud and two counts of mail fraud.  In 
addition, Cohen was charged with conspiracy to transport a 
fraudulently obtained security (the $52,413 check issued by 
Summit for the inflated bond premium), interstate transportation 
of a fraudulently obtained security, and interstate 
transportation of a mail fraud victim.  The frauds on which the 
indictment was based were threefold: (1) a fraud on Wausau in not 
reporting the issuance of the bonds or the receipt of premiums 
therefor; (2) a fraud on Summit by inflating the invoice for the 
bond premium to cover an unrelated indebtedness to C & H; and (3) 
a fraud on potential bond claimants by first returning the 
original bonds for attempted cancellation and then claiming that 
the signatures were forgeries. 
 A five-day joint trial of the appellants was held from 
September 14-18, 1992.  The jury convicted both men of conspiracy 
to commit mail fraud and of the two counts of mail fraud.  The 
jury also convicted Cohen of interstate transportation of a 
fraudulently obtained security, but acquitted him of conspiracy 
to transport a fraudulently obtained security.6 
 On September 25, 1992, appellant Cohen moved for a new trial 
and, in the alternative, for a judgment of acquittal.  That same 
day, appellant Daddona filed motions to set aside the verdict and 
for a new trial.  In October, both parties filed motions for a 
                     
     6  The charge of interstate transportation of a fraud victim 
was dismissed by the judge during the trial. 
 
 
new trial based on newly-discovered evidence.  All of these 
motions were denied by memorandum and order dated January 25, 
1993. 
 Appellant Daddona subsequently filed two additional motions 
for new trial on the grounds of newly-discovered evidence, which 
were denied by the district court initially and on 
reconsideration.  Each of the motions was followed by a motion to 
this Court to remand the matter back to the district court, which 
were also denied. 
 
 E. The Sentencing 
 The presentence reports prepared by the U.S. Probation 
Office set each appellant's base offense level at 6, applying 
U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1.7  Then, relying on the findings of fact made by 
the court during the Culnen sentencing, the probation officer 
calculated the approximate amount of losses to the victims to be 
$1,562,500.8  Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(1)(j), he 
                     
     7  Counts 2 (transportation of a fraudulently obtained 
security), 3 (conspiracy to commit mail fraud), 4 and 5 (mail 
fraud) were counted as a single offense pursuant to U.S.S.G. 
§ 3D1.2(d). 
     8  See Presentence Report of John L. Daddona at 14; 
Presentence Report of Sidney Cohen at 14: 
 The monetary losses caused by the offenses are 
$1,562,500.  This amount is based on the Court's 
finding regarding losses in the case of Daniel J. 
Culnen (Dkt. #1:CR-91-105-001).  In the Court's 
sentencing memorandum in the Culnen case, filed on July 
30, 1992, it was determined that for the purposes of 
sentencing, approximate losses to victims were as 
follows: 
 
 Summit Bond Tax Exempt Fund, L.P.  $1,500,000 
 
 
recommended a nine-level increase to the base offense level.  The 
probation officer also recommended a two-level increase for more 
than minimal planning under U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(2)(A). 
 All sides objected to the offense level calculation.  Cohen 
contended that the losses claimed were either erroneous, not 
covered by the bonds, or settled prior to sentencing.  Daddona 
insisted that he was ignorant of any wrongdoing in the issuance 
of the bonds, and could not therefore be held accountable for 
losses incurred.  In the alternative, Daddona argued that 
Summit's losses could not be included in the calculation, as 
Summit was not a co-obligee on the bond.  The government, on the 
other hand, objected to the lack of a two-point enhancement to 
Cohen's offense level for obstruction of justice. 
 Loss hearings were held on March 30 and April 2, 1993.  The 
government proffered the testimony of Norman Tandy, of Norman 
Tandy & Associates, the company hired by Summit to oversee the 
completion of the project.9  Tandy essentially undertook a "cost 
of completion" analysis -- examining the Summit invoices for the 
period after Eastern left the project site to determine how much 
more Summit spent because of the Eastern default, then 
                                                                  
 Construction Management Corporation/ 
  Aljohn, Inc.             53,000 
 Yingling Construction Company        9,500 
         $1,562,500   
     9  Tandy did not testify in person at the loss hearings.  
Rather, the government moved to supplement the record by 
incorporating the testimony Tandy had given at the sentencing 




subtracting the cost of changes to the project specifications and 
the amount of the original Eastern contract.  He concluded that 
Summit had suffered losses of $1,524,761 as the result of 
appellants' fraudulent conduct. 
 Appellant Daddona offered rebuttal testimony from S. Leonard 
DiDonato of Hill, International, who was qualified as an expert 
construction analyst.  DiDonato independently reviewed Summit's 
records and Tandy's calculations, indicating places where he 
believed Summit had overspent or Tandy had overestimated the 
amount of loss. From these he concluded that Summit could have 
completed the project for $414,719 less than the Eastern contract 
price, and hence had suffered no loss. 
 The trial court resolved the various objections to the 
presentence report in a memorandum dated April 13, 1993.  Most of 
the discussion focused on the amount of loss that properly could 
be attributed to the defendants' fraudulent conduct.  Recognizing 
that each of the experts were "less than fully objective,"  the 
court set out to determine who was the more reliable.  It noted 
that Tandy's calculations had been adopted at the Culnen 
sentencing and therefore had some indicia of reliability.  The 
court also contrasted the "carefully and specifically enumerated" 
deductions of Tandy with the "speculative and repetitive 
deductions" and "artificial numbers" used by DiDonato. 
 The Court found Tandy's testimony to be more dependable, and 
adopted the figure of $1,524,761 as the amount of Summit's loss 
 
 
and $1,568,830 as the total loss for sentencing purposes.10  
However, the court declined to impose a two-level increase for 
more than minimal planning and denied the government's request 
for a two-level enhancement to Cohen's offense level for 
obstruction of justice.  The decision left each appellant with an 
offense level of 15 and a criminal history category of I, 
resulting in a sentencing range of 18 to 24 months.  On 
application of the appellants, the court granted a downward 
departure and sentenced appellants to nine-month terms of 
imprisonment.11   
 
 II 
     LEGAL ANALYSIS 
 Both appellants challenge their judgments of conviction and 
sentences, and Daddona also appeals the district court's denial 
of his second and third motions for new trial.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 over final orders of a 
district court and jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742 to 
review sentences imposed under the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines.  
 Appellants' challenges to their convictions and to the 
district court's denial of Daddona's new trial motions are 
                     
     10  The court also found that Wausau had incurred $44,069 in 
legal fees as a result of the fraud.  It did not, however, 
address the claims of the other subcontractors, concluding that 
Summit's loss alone was sufficient to place defendants in the $1-
$2 million range.  
     11  Appellants are out on bail pending appeal. 
 
 
without merit.12  However, their claims regarding the calculation 
of their sentences require further analysis. 
 
 A. The Standard of Review 
 "When reviewing the sentencing decisions of the district 
courts, '[w]e exercise plenary review over legal questions about 
the meaning of the sentencing guidelines, but apply the 
deferential clearly erroneous standard to factual determinations 
                     
     12  Daddona's claims included the following: (1) the 
evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the 
trial court erred in denying appellant's motion for a new trial 
based on an alleged Brady violation without conducting an 
evidentiary hearing; (3) the trial court erred in admitting 
certain government exhibits and testimony; (4) the trial court 
erred in allowing the government to use a summary chart during 
its closing arguments; (5) the trial court erred in submitting 
the indictment to the jury, in drafting the verdict form, and in 
answering a question from the jury; and (6) the trial court 
improperly allowed the government to question Daddona about a 
"check-swapping" arrangement. 
 Cohen's claims included the following: (1) the trial court 
erred in denying appellant's motion for new trial based on an 
alleged Brady violation without conducting an evidentiary 
hearing; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his 
convictions; (3) the trial court erred in permitting the 
introduction of an "inaccurate and fabricated 'closing 
statement'"; (4) the trial court erred in allowing the government 
to use a summary chart during its closing arguments; (5) the 
trial court erred in submitting the indictment to the jury, in 
drafting the verdict form, and in answering a question from the 
jury; (6) the trial court improperly permitted evidence of a 
"check-swapping" arrangement; and (7) the trial court erred in 
incorporating by reference testimony from the Culnen sentencing 
hearing.   
 Cohen also challenged the failure of the district court to 
depart downward, either based on his acceptance of responsibility 
or on his age and infirmity.  However, because on remand the 
district court is free to revisit the issue of departures from 
the properly calculated sentencing range, we need not consider 
these claims here. 
 
 
underlying their application.'" United States v. Fuentes, 954 
F.2d 151, 152-53 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 
S.Ct. 2950, 119 L.Ed.2d 573 (1992), quoting United States v. 
Inigo, 925 F.2d 641, 658 (3d Cir.1991).   
 Under the Sentencing Guidelines, the base offense level for 
fraud is six, U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(a), which must be increased 
according to the size of the loss attributed to the fraud.  
U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b).  Because appellants challenge the district 
court's interpretation of the "loss" concept in § 2F1.1(b), our 
review is plenary.  See Kopp, 951 U.S. at 526; United States v. 
Bierley, 922 F.2d 1061, 1064 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 
 
 B.  Calculating the Amount of Loss for Sentencing Purposes 
 The version of U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b) in effect at the time the 
offenses were committed set forth the following method of 
adjusting the offense level :   
 (1) If the loss exceeded $2,000, increase the offense 
level as follows:  
 Loss       Increase in Level 
 . . .  
 (G) $100,001 - $200,000    add 6 
 (H) $200,001 - $500,000    add 7 
 (I) $500,001 - $1,000,000   add 8 
 (J) $1,000,001 - $2,000,000   add 9 
 . . . .  
U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b) (Nov. 1987); see generally U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, 
commentary at 2 ("'Loss' means the value of the property taken, 
damages, or destroyed.").13  The district court found the total 
                     
     13  Although it is proper to use the Guidelines in effect at 
the time of sentencing, see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(a), application of 
 
 
loss for sentencing purposes to be $1,568,830. U.S.S.G. 
§ 2F1.1(b). Appellants assert, and we agree, that the losses 
claimed by Summit were not caused by their fraudulent activity 
and should not have been included in the U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 
calculation. 
 
 C. Cost to Complete as a Measure of Loss 
  It should be noted at the outset that we do not question 
the district court's factual determination that Summit's cost to 
complete the Green Hill project exceeded $1,500,000. The trial 
judge heard extensive testimony on that issue and his factual 
determination finds more than adequate support in the record. 
What the record does not contain is any indication that this loss 
was due to the fraud of the appellants rather than the obvious 
failure of two general contractors, Susquehanna and ECU, to 
fulfill their contractual obligations in a timely fashion. 
 Culnen was a registered independent agent of Wausau with 
actual and apparent authority to execute and deliver surety 
bonds.  While there may have been fraud in the failure to advise 
Wausau of the issuance, in the inflated invoice, in their 
redelivery to Culnen, and in the effort to mislead possible 
obligees concerning their validity, the fact remains that the 
                                                                  
the version of § 2F1.1 contained in the November 1992 Guidelines 
Manual would have resulted in the imposition of more severe 
penalties.  The district court and the probation officer 
therefore properly applied the Guidelines in effect at the time 
of the offense.  See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(b). 
 
 
bonds appear to have been validly issued and enforceable by any 
proper obligee who relied on their issuance.14 
 Under Pennsylvania law, a principal is liable for the acts 
of its agent committed in the scope of its employment, even 
though the principal did not authorize the act.  Aiello v. Ed 
Saxe Real Estate, Inc., 508 Pa. 553, 499 A.2d 282 (1982); see 
also Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Casualty Ins. Co. v. Insurance 
Comm'r of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 121 Pa.Cmwlth. 618, 
551 A.2d 368 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988).  Thus, to the extent that 
Summit (or any other claimant) has any rights under the bonds, 
either initially or pursuant to later agreements, those rights 
would continue to exist. 
 Although Summit was the project lender, it was not a named 
obligee under either the performance or payment bonds as they 
were initially issued.  Green Hill was the obligee on the 
performance bond, while the payment bond named as obligees only 
those 
 having a direct contract with [ECU] or with a 
subcontractor of [ECU] for labor, material or both, 
used or reasonably required for use in the performance 
                     
     14  In a recent decision from the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania, York Excavating Co., Inc. v. Employers Insurance of 
Wausau, No. CV-91-1037 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 21, 1993)(Memorandum 
Opinion of Hon. James F. McClure, Jr., U.S.D.J.), the court 
denied claims brought by one of the project subcontractors 
against the Wausau bonds for work done pursuant to written and 
oral agreements entered into in 1987.  However, the decision was 
not premised on the validity of the bonds, but rather on the 
validity of York's claims.  The court found insufficient evidence 
of an oral agreement with ECU.  Furthermore, the court found that 
since ECU was not a party to the written contracts by which York 




of the Contract, labor and material being construed to 
include that part of water, gas, power, light, heat, 
oil gasoline, telephone service or rental of equipment 
directly applicable to the Contract. 
 
York Excavating, slip. op. at 13.   
 There is also indication in the record that Summit was aware 
that it was not an obligee when it agreed to accept ECU as the 
new general contractor.  Daddona App. at 259. Of course, a lender 
benefits indirectly by the existence of a performance or payment 
bond in favor of the owner and subcontractors. However, because 
of the Cohen family indemnity, it is clear that Green Hill, 
controlled by Cohen, would have been reluctant to exercise its 
rights under the bonds. However, the indictment in this case does 
not charge the existence of this indemnity as an act of fraud, 
nor did Summit insist in April of 1988, when negotiating the 
foreclosure settlement, that Green Hill exercise its rights under 
the bonds. The record is clear that Summit feared a protracted 
foreclosure battle and wanted a quick settlement to take control 
of the project.  
 It is equally clear that Green Hill's assignment and escrow 
of the bonds was limited to guaranteeing that existing debts to 
subcontractors were paid by Green Hill.15 There is nothing in the 
                     
     15   The Escrow Agreement specifically provides in the first 
paragraph that the bonds 
shall be held  
 for the benefit of [Summit] until such time as there 
are no mechanics liens filed against the Project 
resulting from events that occurred prior to the date 
hereof . . . provided, however, that in the event no 
Mechanics Liens have been filed against the Project by 




record to suggest that Summit ever had to pay debts to 
subcontractors that were outstanding at the time it took over the 
property. When Wausau denied Summit's bond claim on October 7, 
1988, there is no indication that Summit thereafter took any 
legal action against Wausau, notwithstanding the significant 
amount at issue. 
 It does not appear from the record before us that Summit was 
harmed in any way by the issuance of the bonds.  Nor can we say 
that Summit was harmed by the efforts of Cohen, Daddona, and 
Culnen at various times to deny the existence of the bonds.  As 
previously noted Summit has no direct rights under the bonds as a 
named obligee, and its rights as assignee of Green Hill in the 
settlement of April, 1988, were not only sharply limited, but 
also unnecessary since the condition of the escrow was satisfied. 
 A recent decision from the Seventh Circuit offers insight 
into the issue of measuring damages for sentencing purposes in a 
fraud case.  The appellant in United States v. Marlatt, 24 F.3d 
1005 (7th Cir. 1994), owned a title company which sold title 
insurance underwritten by Ticor Title Insurance Company 
("Ticor").  Marlatt purchased a resort hotel and converted it 
into time-shared condominium units.  With each unit sold, he 
issued a title insurance policy underwritten by Ticor.  However, 
while the policies represented clear title to the units, the 
titles were in fact heavily encumbered.  When Ticor discovered 
this, it spent $476,000 to clear the titles.  Later, in response 
                                                                  
Cohen App. at 330a. 
 
 
to the threat of lawsuits from the purchasers of the 
condominiums, Ticor spent an additional $565,000 to repurchase 
all of the units sold. 
 Marlatt pled guilty to one count of mail fraud and one count 
of making false statements to the Department of Labor.  In 
determining the amount of loss pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b), 
the district court included both the money spent clearing the 
title and the money spent repurchasing the units, presumably 
concluding that both were elements of the loss caused by the 
fraud.  The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence, even though it 
conceded that the expense of repurchasing the units might be 
considered as having been caused by the appellant's fraud, in the 
sense of "but for" causation: 
 
  Even if it had been, it was not chargeable to the 
defendant under section 2F1.1 of the guidelines.  
Application Note 7(b) distinguishes between loss on the 
one hand and consequential and incidental damages on 
the other and makes it clear that with irrelevant 
exceptions the latter two items are not to be counted 
in computing the loss for purposes of sentencing under 
this guideline.  The reason for that distinction is no 
doubt to prevent the sentencing hearing from turning 
into a tort or contract suit.  The distinction is 
nicely illustrated by this case.  The defendant 
extracted from Ticor by fraud a bunch of insurance 
policies on which Ticor was required to make good to 
the tune of $476,000. In the wake of the loss Ticor 
incurred other expenses, which were consequences, 
perhaps even foreseeable consequences, of the fraud, 
but were not the thing actually taken from Ticor. . . .  
 
Id. at 1007-08 (citations omitted). 
 Other circuits have likewise drawn a distinction between 
losses that were directly caused by the fraud and "consequential 
 
 
and incidental damages."  See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 6 
F.3d 623, 630 (9th Cir. 1993)("[The measure of loss] does not 
include consequential losses.  If the Sentencing Commission had 
intended to include consequential losses, it would have included 
them in the definition of loss."); United States v. Wilson, 993 
F.2d 214, 217 (11th Cir. 1993)("The phrase 'property taken, 
damaged or destroyed' does not allow for inclusion of incidental 
or consequential injury, and it is error to rely on evidence of 
such injury in calculating loss when the value of the property 
may be ascertained."), citing United States v. Thomas, 973 F.2d 
1152, 1159 & n.9 (5th Cir. 1992); cf. United States v. Stanley, 
12 F.3d 17, 20-21 (2d Cir. 1993).   
 While it may be that Summit's excess cost to complete the 
project is in some sense a consequence, at least in part, of its 
involvement with Cohen and Daddona, this loss is "not the thing 
actually taken" from Summit as a result of their fraudulent 
activities. 
  We do not mean to suggest that no financial losses were 
incurred by the fraudulent activities of the appellants.  Wausau 
has suffered actual harm in the form of legal expenses, and 
potential harm in the form of possible claims against the bond.  
Some of the subcontractors and materialmen who were covered by 
the payment bond may also have suffered losses, although only a 
few claims have surfaced and one of the largest has been recently 
rejected by the Middle District of Pennsylvania.   
 Whatever losses Summit or others may have suffered from 
appellant's fraud, Summit has not demonstrated any losses which 
 
 
can fairly be measured by its cost to complete the project, and 
it was therefore error for the district court to incorporate 
Tandy's calculations into the U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 determination of 
the loss caused by the fraud. The sentences will be vacated, and 
the matter remanded to the district court for resentencing. 
 
 
 
